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by Arthur M. Frank 
CRIMINAL LAW - Rightto a Speedy 
Trial 
In Epps v. State, No. 236, Term 1974, 
the Maryland Court of Appeals freed a 
defendant who was convicted two years 
ago of robbery with a deadly weapon 
because he had been denied a speedv 
trial as guaranteed by federal and state 
constitutions. Judge O'Donnell held 
that "a delay in affording a criminal de-
fendant a "speedy tria\' because of over-
crowded dockets and scheduling prob-
lems, the responsibility for which rests 
upon both courts and prosecutors, can-
not be classified as wholly 'neutral' and 
must be included within the period of 
delay in determining whether there has 
been a denial of this constitutional 
right." 
Mr. Epps, arrested in August of 1972, 
was not tried until August of 1973. Alibi 
witnesses were unavailable to testify as a 
result of the delay. The Cause of delay 
included the illness of the arresting of-
ficer and lack of available jury dates. Mr. 
Epps did not even want a jury triat; how-
ever, the state wanted to jointly try the 
present defendant with two other co-
defendants. 
This was the first case in which the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland ordered a 
criminal defendant free since the United 
States Supreme Court, in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), set out a 
balancing test (in which the conduct of 
both the prosecution and the defendant 
are weighed) to determine whether a 
speedy trial has been denied allOWing 
one to go "absolutely" free. The court 
in Barker v. Wingo rejected the 
"demand-waive" rule as being too rigid. 
Justice Powell outlined four factors to 
consider in this balancing process: 
1. Length of delay, 
2. Reason for the delay, 
3. The defendant's assertion of his 
right, and 
4. Prejudice to the defendant, in 
order to: 
a. prevent oppressive pretrial in-
carceration, 
b. minimize anxiety and concern 
of the accused, and 
c. limit the possibility that the de-
fense will be impaired. 
The Court of Appeals for Maryland is 
to be commended for its well-reasoned 
opinion. The court took proper cogni-
zance of the Fifth Ammendment: "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
tria\." It should be noted that in Barker v. 
Wingo, the Supreme Court held that 
Barker was not deprived of his due pro-
cess right to a speedy tria\. The Supreme 
Court could just not bear to let a "crimi-
nal" go free. In Barker v. Wingo, the 
Court stated that length of delay is to be 
considered, though five years was not 
enough in that case; that the 
"demand-waiver rule" was rejected, yet 
held to be persuasive in Barker's case; 
and that cause of delay is significant, but 
not considering that the state has the 
burden of bringing the accused to trial in 
a speedy manner. 
The Maryland courts are not bound 
by U.S. Supreme Court standards (at 
least how that Court applies them) to the 
letter, as long as they give substantial 
due process as defined by that Court. 
But Maryland may maintain stricter 
standards to insure the accused 
"adequate" due process (more than 
"substantial"?) And it seems that Mary-
land, as shown by Epps is broadening 
the due process right to a speedy tria\. 
EVIDENCE - Impeachment of Wit-
ness 
In Yowell v. State, No. 18, Term 
1975 - filed October 3, 1975, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
held that "refusal to permit cross-
examination based on witness' alleged 
prior inconsistent statement foreclosed 
the trial tactic of impeachment and de-
nied the Appellant a fair and impartial 
tria\." 
Michael Dale Yowell was convicted of 
rape, assault and perverted sexual prac-
tice by a jury. At trial, defense counsel 
showed the prosecutrix a statement she 
made earlier to a public defender's in-
vestigator on cross-examination. The 
court refused to allow cross-
examination as to the alleged prior in-
consistent statement in the report be-
cause the statement was not given under 
oath. 
The Court of Special Appeals held the 
substantive issue was procedurally be-
fore the court in light of Maryland Rule 
1085 (review being limited to questions 
decided by the lower court), since the 
defense did make an effort to lay a foun-
dation for impeachment, but was frus-
trated in making a proffer due to the 
judge forbidding same because the 
statement was not made under oath. 
Turning to the substantive issue, the 
court held that prior inconsistent state-
ments for impeachment purposes need 
not be under oath. "It is enough that the 
statement, oral or in writing, be made 
prior to the giving of the challenged tes-
timony, and that it be material to the 
facts at issue and not merely collateral or 
irrelevant." The court noted its prior rul-
ing in Sanders v. State, 1 Md. App. 630, 
232 A.2d 555 (1967): "Provided a pro-
per foundation has been laid, the credit 
of a witness may be impeached by show-
ing he has made statements which con-
tradict his testimony in respect to mate-
rial facts ... To lay the foundation for such 
evidence, the witness must be first inter-
rogated as to the time, place and person 
to whom contradictory statements were 
made." This was attempted by defense 
counsel in the present case. The court 
notes that in Sanders, nothing was men-
tioned to the effect that the prior incon-
sistent statement had to be under oath. 
The present case now affirmatively ex-
tends Sanders to statements not made 
under oath. 
As a result of the judge's denial of the 
use of the prior inconsistent statement, 
Yowell was denied a fair and impartial 
trial guaranteed under the United States 
Constitution and the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights, and therefore, the judg-
ment was reversed. 
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